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Abstract
The Shapley value for nonatomic games is used to determine the
shares of equity and risky debt in the value of a firm facing uncertain
growth opportunities. We include the "voting power" attached to equity
holdings and focus on the bargaining between shareholders and debt-
holders, where the two classes may overlap, obtaining an extension of
the Modigliani-Miller theorem.

Growth and the Levered Firm
I. Introduction
In this paper we take a game theoretic approach to the analysis of
investment behavior in levered firms facing opportunities for growth.
Despite the negative conclusions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and
its variants as to the meaning of corporate financial policy and the
effect of corporate debt policy on optimal investment in a static world,
Myers (1977) argues that the presence of risky debt maturing after in-
vestment decisions are taken provides a disincentive to the full exploi-
tation of growth opportunities. This happens because the debt is risky:
if the investment is made, its fruits must be shared with the debt-
holders, but if it is not made, no payment need be made to them. Recently
Aivazian and Callen (1980) took issue with Myers' results and provided
a game-theoretic model which takes explicit account of the "negotiation
risk" involved between the debt- and equity-holders. The basic idea is
that the disincentive effect of the debt creates a loss in total value
to the levered firm. By agreeing on a division of the inframarginal gains
created by taking the optimal investment activity as perceived by the
all-equity firm, the debt- and equity-holders can avoid this loss. The
essential question is how this bargaining is to take place.
In the A-C model, the fact that there is both objective and strategic
uncertainty lead the authors to propose using the Shapley value to allo-
cate the inf ramarginal gains. However, there are two features of their
application that limit the applicability of their results. In the first
place, they formulate the bargaining as taking place between two separate
players; an "equity player" and a "debt player". In the second place,
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the amount of investment is not limited by financing possibilities, nor
is it influenced by the state of nature.
The model we shall develop in this paper avoids these limitations.
By using the Shapley value for nonatomic games, we are able to deal with
a more realistic process of negotiation between all the parties, who may
have differing amounts of debt and equity in their portfolios, and thus
a wide spectrum of interests. In fact, we shall describe a "coalition"
of parties by two measures, one of which is the percentage of the firm's
equity held by members of the coalition, while the other is the percent-
age of the firm's debt held by coalition members. Moreover, we shall
further refine the game by taking into account the "voting power" of
equity, in the sense that a coalition with a majority of the firm's
equity can vote for any feasible investment plan, while a minority
coalition cannot.
As far as the level of investment is concerned, we shall present
several formulations. In the first, we shall assume that the amount of
investment that the all-equity firm would wish to engage in is sensitive
to the state of nature, but does not depend on financing arrangements;
the money is raised from outside sources, and repaid to those sources.
In this case, the effect of debt is relatively weak: what matters is
whether a coalition can vote for investment or not, and the only effect
of debt-holdings is to reduce the winning coalition's debt liability to
the rest of the players. In the second, we shall take the position that
the investment funds are to be drawn from the company's debt, so that a
winning coalition which does not have much debt may be limited in the
scale of investment it undertakes by a financial constraint which may
-3-
be tighter than that provided by the state dependence of the value-of-
investment function.
In the second section of the paper, we present the Myers and A-C
approaches. The more general model is developed in the following three
sections; first, we introduce the nonatomic value and calculate the
implicit value of debt and equity when there is a fixed optimal scale of
investment. Then we weaken this to allow for state dependence of optimal
scale, and finally we present the model with a financial constraint as
well. In the last section, we develop some game-theoretic subtleties
and provide some suggestions for future exploitation of this model. The
author wishes to thank C-F Lee for introducing him to the issues, and
Y. Taumann and L. Mirman for helpful discussions on the topic. Respon-
sibility for all errors remains with the author.
II. The model and previous results
The scenario we are dealing with is best described as follows: at
date 0, a firm with some risky debt in its portfolio faces an investment
decision. The state of the world is revealed at date 1, and the firm
decides whether or not to invest a fixed amount. At date 2, if the firm
has invested I and if the true state of the world revealed at t = 1 was
S, the firm reaps a value V(S)
,
pays the amount I to the banks, and pays
the amount P to its debt-holders. On the other hand, if the firm did
not invest at date 1, then all the parties receive exactly 0. Our mea-
sure of the value of the firm will be the present value of the firm's
policy as of date 0; before the state is revealed.
We shall assume that all states have equal prior probability, and
so that the value-of-investment function V(S) is increasing in S.
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2.1 The all-equity firm
We can easily describe the value of the all-equity firm. Letting
q(S) be the equilibrium price at t=0 of one dollar at t=l contingent
on the occurrence of state S, the value of the optimal policy is
V* = Jq(S)maxI0, VCS)-I]dS
We shall further define the "breakeven" state for the all equity firm,
S
a
,
by
vcs
a
) - I
1
so that V* = /q(S)[VCS) - I]dS, since the state space will be taken to
S
be the unit interval, [0,1],
2.2 The levered form
In this case, the firm has an obligation to pay $P in period 2 if
it undertakes the investment project. Thus, the firm's net disbursements
in the event of investment are I to the banks and P to the debt-holders,
so we may define the "breakeven" state for the levered firm, S
,
by
V(S, ) = I + P
b
Clearly, S is no greater than S, . The values at t = of the firm's
a ° b
debt [subscript B] and equity Isubscript E] are thus:
1
V = P / q(S)dSB
S
b
1 1
V = / q(S)V(S)dS - (I + P) / q(S)dS
S
b
S
b
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The total value of the levered firm under this "noncooperative" optimiza-
1
tion is therefore VD + V = / q(S) [VCS)-I]dS, and the welfare loss due
S
h
to the presence of the risky debt in the portfolio of the levered firm
is:
L = /
D
q(S)IV(S) - I]dS
S
a
The next step in the argument is to posit a process of negotiation
whereby the equity holders, in effect, buy out the debt-holders and
undertake the optimal amount of investment. The price they pay lies
somewhere between and the amount of loss L. The result of this
"Coasian" argument is that the firm follows the "correct" investment
policy, resulting in a present value of V*. However, the allocation of
the gain L between the two sides depends on their relative bargaining
strengths.
To resolve this ambiguity, and to focus attention on the process
of negotiation, A-C adopt three axioms from Roth's (1979) probabilistic
approach to the Shapley value. These actions describe the value U(i,v)
of playing position i in the game v. v is a characteristic function
game of transf errable utility, which means that v is a map assigning to
each possible coalition C a real number v(C) called the "worth" of C,
representing a profit divisible between the members of C in any way they
choose. These axioms state that: i) a person should be indifferent
between games where he contributes nothing to any coalition; ii) a person
should be risk-neutral as regards probabilistic combinations of games;
and iii) a person should exhibit "strategic risk neutrality" in the sense
that he is indifferent between the option of playing in a symmetric pure
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bargaining game with, k participants and receiving 1/k of the total to be
divided in that game. The unique function U(i,v) satisfying these axioms
is the Shapley value, which pays each player his expected marginal con-
tribution to a "random coalition" consisting of the players preceeding
the given player in a random ordering of the players drawn with prob-
ability
-p
The characteristic function used by A-C is for a two player game,
with players E and B and is as follows:
v(E:S) = v(B:S) =
v(E,B:S) = max[0,V(S)-I]
for S < S,
— D
and
v(E:S) = V(S) - I - P
v(B:S) = P otherwise
v(E,B:S) = V(S) - I
From these, we can calculate the Shapley value for each state S, and take
its expected present value as of t = 0, giving
i
Sh 1
U(E) = y J q(S)IVCS) - I]dS + / q(S)IV(S) - I - P]dS
a b
U(B) = i / qCSMVCS) - I]dS + P / q(S)dS
S S
^a b
In other words, the Shapley value in this case merely splits the difference
in values between the levered and unlevered firms equally between the two
partners E and B, and leaves the other gains untouched.
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III. The more general model, I: portfolio effects
We regard the participants as forming a continuum, identified with
the unit interval [0,1], The set of possible coalitions is identified
with the Borel subsets of the player set. Each coalition C has a share
E(C) € [0,1] of the firm's equity and a share B(C) £ [0,1] of the firm's
debt. For the purposes of this section we shall fix the optimal amount
of investment at I, regardless of the state. We do not need to assume
that the two measures, E and B are independent , all we need is that the
range of (E,B) is convex and compact, which follows from the assumption
that they are nonatomic by Lyapunov's theorem.
Suppose that a coalition C has formed. If E(C) < y, then C is power-
less to vote for new investment, and thus has a worth of 0. If C is a
majority coalition and votes to undertake the investment project, its
total payoff is
r(C) = IV(S) - I - P]ECC) + PBCC)
We can define the "breakeven" state for the coalition C, S , by
vcs
c
) = z + p(1
-
eTcT}
this being the state at which C will just find it worthwhile to invest.
The characteristic function giving the worth of C in state S, w(C:S),
is given by
w(C:S) =
'0 if ECC) < 1/2 or S < S
r(C) otherwise.
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Now r is a linear function of the two measure E and B, for fixed S, and
so it belongs to the space of nonatomic games called DIAG: games in
this space have the convenient property (which motivates our use of the
continuum model) that their values are completely determined by the be-
havior of the characteristic function in a neighborhood of the "diagonal",
where E(C) = B(C). In fact, we can make use of the "diagonal formula:"
the value of a coalition C is just the integral up the diagonal of the
directional derivation of the characteristic function in the direction
(ECC),B(C)).
Of course, this is not quite the end of the story, since we are not
working with the characteristic function r but with its "E-truncation."
However, the value of a diagonal game which has a finite number of jumps
across manifolds transverse to the diagonal still exists and can be
easily calculated. In this case, if we let r(E,B) denote the function
r defined above, evaluated at any C s.t. E(C) = E and B(C) = B, the
value of the truncated game is:
1
i I
1/2
U(C:S) = r(y,y)E(C) + / 3
c
r(t,t)dt
where 3 r denotes the directional derivative of r in the direction
(E(C),B(C)):
3
c
r(t,t) = [VCS) - I - PJECC) + PB(C).
In other words, the value is given by:
U(C:S) = [V(S) - I]E(C) - |e(C) + |b(C)
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at least for states S >_ S . However, thanks to the diagonal formula,
the complication posed by the breakeven state does not affect us. The
breakeven state for a diagonal coalition is exactly S as defined in
Section 2.1 above.
To facilitate interpretation of this result, we must examine its
efficiency, its rationality, and compare it to the A-C result for the
two-player game. First, the worth of the grand coalition is precisely
U(N:S) = V(S) - I for all S > S
— a
which shows efficiency. By "rationality" we mean the idea that no co-
alition is given less than it can assure itself of by independent action.
In essence, this means that we are looking for an outcome in the core.
However, due to the truncation of this game, the characteristic function
is not convex, so we are not guaranteed that the value will be in the
core, or indeed that the core exists at all. However, in this game the
linearity of the untruncated game comes to our rescue: the core of the
truncated game includes the core of the untruncated game, together with
all allocations giving less than r(C) to minority coalitions. However,
it can readily be seen that the value does not provide a core allocation:
coalitions having more debt than equity are disadvantaged by the value.
Before comparing the result for the truncated game with the A-C
result, we shall also determine the value of the game r by itself (with-
out regard to the political dimension added by considering only coali-
tions with a majority of the firm's equity), and express both of these
values as t=0 expected present values. The value of r is equal to r,
since r is linear in both measures E and B. To facilitate expressing
these values, let us define:
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1
G(S) = / q(S)[V(S) - I]dS
S
1
Q(S) = / q(S)dS
S
Moreover, we shall "linearize" the A-C result by dividing U(E) pro-
portionately to E(C) and U(B) proportionately to B(C). Our three values
are:
A-C: U(C) = i[G(S
a
)-H3(S
b
)-PQ(S
b
))]E(C) +
-|-TG(S
a
)-G(S
b
)+PQ(S
b
)]B(C)
untruncated r: r(C) = IG(S )-PQ(S )]E(C) + [PQ(S )]B(C)
a a a
truncated r: W(C) = [G(S ) - ^PQ(S )]E(C) + -kpQ(S )]B(C)
a £m a £ a
Several words of interpretation are in order at this point. First,
both the untruncated game and the linearized A-C result have values in
the core, while the truncated game does not. Further insight comes from
comparing the shadow prices of debt and equity. Both U and W divide the
scheduled debt payment PQ(St ) for states greater than S, equally betweenb b
debt and equity. However, U does not divide the debt payment for states
between S and S, : for these states the payoff is insensitive to the
a b
size of the debt-holders' prior claim. This is due to the fact that
they are "frozen out" of the bargaining in the A-C model, being purely
passive partners. In r and W, however, P does play a role for the inter-
mediate states, although the power of the debt-holders, and thus their
payoff, is least in the truncated game which takes account of the voting
power of equity.
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The essence of the difference is that in U it is G(S )-G(S._) that is
a b
divided equally between debt and equity, while in r and W it is PQ(S )
3.
that is divided. We conclude this section with three diagrams showing
geometrically how the gains from investment are divided.
VCS)-I
1
A-C W
[The shaded areas are divided equally between debt and equity; the areas
marked E(B) go entirely to equity (debt),]
IV. The more general model, II : State-sensitive optimal investment
levels with bank- financing.
In this section, we remark that there is no essential loss of gen-
erality in allowing the value-of-investment function to achieve its
maximum at levels of investment that vary with the state of the world.
We start with a value-of-investment function V(I:S) - I, and the
majority coalition will solve the problem
max V(I:S) - I
I€R
+
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the optimal level of investment being denoted I(S). The "indirect value
function" is:
V*(S) = V(I(S):S) - I(S)
We shall still retain the assumption that V*(S) is increasing in S, so
that the "breakeven" states for the all equity firm and the "atomistic"
levered firm a la A-C have their usual definitions:
S* satisfies V*(S*) =
a a
S* satisfies V*(S*) = P
b b
To facilitate expressing the values, we modify the definition of G(S):
1
G*(S) = / q(S)V*(S)dS
S
and we can now write the three values as:
A-C: U*(C) = i[G*(S*)+G*(S*)-PQ(S*)]E(C) + i[G*(S*)-G*(S*)+PQ(S*)]B(C)
2. a b b L a b b
untruncated r: r*CC) = IG*(S*)-PQ(S*)]E(C) + IPQ(S*)]B(C)
truncated r: W*(C) = IG*(S*) -Iq(S*)]E(C) + |<J(S*)B(C)
V. The more general model, III : Debt-financed, state-dependent optimal
investment.
In this section, we examine the effect of requiring that the new
investment be financed out of debt capital. In the first instance, we
suppose that this. capital must be drawn from the existing debt capital,
so that a coalition C has at its disposal funds of PB(C) to invest. To
simplify matters, we shall normalize investment levels as well, so that
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feasible investments for the firm as a whole lie between and 1, thus
suppressing P.
Assuming that these monies are denumerated in present dollars, we
can write the revised characteristic function of the coalition C in state
S as
:
if E(C) < j
w(C:S) = [V(B(C),S)-B(C)]E(C)+B(C) if E(C) >_ j and B(C) < I(S)
V*(S)E(C) + B(C) otherwise
This function is truncated twice, since both debt- and equity-holders can
affect the coalition's ability to undertake optimal-scale investment.
There are two cases, depending on whether I(S) -_-. In Case I,
I(S) < -r-, so that any coalition near the diagonal with enough votes to
choose an investment plan has enough liquidity to make the optimal scale
of investment. In Case II there is a non-null collection of coalitions
which can vote for investment but only up to the level of their resources.
The value in Case I is fairly simple, and agrees with the value of
the game without this liquidity constraint:
>MC:S) = JV*(S) +i]E(C) + -|e(C)
This is a sensible formula since with the present normalization the value
of the firm's combined debt and equity is V*(S) + 1. Thus, the payment
to the debt-holders is divided 50:50.-
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Case II is more subtle. To analyze this game, we must exploit the
linearity of the Shapley value. Let us define two component games, w
and w„ as follows:
W;L (C:S) = [V(B(C),S) - B(C)]E(C) + B(C)
w
2
(C:S) = V*(S)E(C) + B(C)
For coalitions along the diagonal, the original game w can be represented
as the sum of two games: the game w truncated below E(C) =
-j, and
the game w - w. truncated below B(C) = I(S) . Since the value of the
sum is the sum of the values, we obtain
B^Ct.t) = [V(t,S) - t]E(C) + [tV'(t,S) + 1 - t]B(C)
3
c
(w
2
-w
1
)t,t) = lVCKS),S)-I(S)-V(t,S)+t]E(C)+It-tV'(t,S)]B(C)
So the values of the truncated versions of these component games, denoted
w.. and (w_-w.. ) , respectively, are:
^l = [^V(j,S)+V(i-,S)- |]E(C)+IV(1,S)- ^V(y,S)+ | - V(|,S)]B(C)
Hw^) 1 = [(1-I(S))(V(I(S),S)-I(S) +i-il2 (S)-V(I(S),S)]E(C)
+lj - |l 2 (S)-V(l,S)+I(S)V(I(S),S)+?(I(S),S)]B(C)
where
1
v(t,s) = / vct,s)dt
t
Thus, the value of w is
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2
¥w(C) = [|v(|, S)+|+V(ICS),S)-I(S)-I(S)V(I(S),S)+-J-p-
KS)
+ / V(t,S)dt]E(C)+[|- - ±V(±-,S)+I(S)V(I(S),S)
1/2 ° Z l
-
L
-^L - / VCt,S)dtlB(C)
1/2
It is easily checked that the value of the entire firm is V(I(S) ,S)-I(S)+1,
To obtain the overall value of the firm as of t = we merely integrate
over states S with the appropriate contingent funds price. This is done
in the First Appendix, where the entire analysis is summarized and the
shadow prices of debt and equity presented for each approach.
VI. Some Game-Theoretic Issues
In this section, we address four issues. First, we discuss the
diagonal formula for the value, giving some sufficient conditions for
its validity, and showing that it is still valid when the measures on
which the game is based are not independent, so long as they are non-
atomic measures. Second, we discuss the general issue of games with
discontinuities along the diagonal. One important class of games with
this feature is "truncation games" of the sort used here: the range of
the component measures is divided into a number of more-or-less regular
regions, and a different characteristic function is used in each one.
Under certain conditions, the value of the composite game can still be
calculated by a modified version of the diagonal formula. This device
allowed us to deal with voting stock and capitalization limits, and can
also be used to incorporate the effects of other forms of corporate
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finance: preferred stock; convertibles; options and the like. The
details of these applications will form the subject of a subsequent paper.
Third, we shall discuss the relation between these "value-based" results
and the core of the underlying game. In their third section, A-C make
much of the fact that, with three or more classes of asset-holders, the
core may be empty. We shall present conditions that guarantee the non-
emptiness of the core, and discuss the meaning of the value when the
core is empty. In brief, we shall argue that the reasons leading one
to use the value are unaffected by the emptiness of the core.
As mentioned above, one can often express the Shapley value as the
integral of a certain derivative. In the case of a "vector measure
game", where
V(C) = f(y
1
(C) u
n
(C)) = f(y(C))
for each coalition C, where the y. are nonatomic measures*, we have the
formula:
1
V(C) = / f (t.y(D)dt
L
where f denotes the derivative of the function f in the direction u(C).
Li
In the case where the range of the vector measure y has dimension n, so
that none of the component measures is a function of the other n-1 we
can restate this formula as
n 1
V(C) = E u.CC) / f CtyCDJdt
i=l
where f. is the partial derivative of f w.r.t. its i argument. In gen-
eral, if the measures are correlated enough to reduce the dimension of
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the range of y, then there exists another vector measure, v, whose
components are linear combinations of the y., s.t. the above formula is
valid when the u's are replaced with v's. Of course, we require that
the function f be continuously differentiable on the range of y.
At any rate, this formula tells us that for such a game the values
are always linear combinations of the underlying measures. However, the
intuition behind the diagonal formula may be a bit unclear, since it seems
to suggest that the only thing affecting the value is the behavior of
the characteristic function at diagonal coalitions: scaled down versions
of the coalition of the whole. It might seem that these diagonal coali-
tions might not be in the range of y, or that the Law of Large Numbers
might involve the "most probable" coalitions being off-diagonal coali-
tions. However, since the measures are nonatomic, which means that for
every coalition C with u.(C) > 0, there exists a subcoalition C' C C with
y.(C) > y.(C') > 0, we can apply Lyapunov's Theorem. This result states
that the range of a nonatomic vector-valued measure is convex and com-
pact; since it contains (0,0,..., 0) = y(0) and (y (I),...,y (I)), it must
contain all points of the form (ty.. (I) , . .
.
, ty (I)) for t e [0,1], which
1 n
is the diagonal. Moreover, the strong LLN tells us that these are in-
deed the most probable coalitions, even though one cannot formulate the
value for nonatomic games precisely in terms of random orders. Finally,
it should be noted that while the diagonal may well have nonempty inter-
section with the boundary of the range of u» all of the directional
derivatives of coalitions C will be evaluated along directions "pointing
into" the range of y.
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Examples of sufficient conditions for the value to enjoy the diagonal
property include the following:
i) if V = f°y, where u is a normalized, nonnegative nonatomic measure
and f is a function of bounded variation with f (0) = 0, continuous at
and 1, then V enjoys the diagonal property: its value is completely
determined by the behavior of f near the diagonal.
ii) if V belongs to the span of the games defined above, it has
the diagonal property.
iii) if V belongs to the closure (in the variation norm) of the
space of polynomials of nonatomic measures, it has the diagonal property.
iv) if the value is continuous in the variation norm (as an operator
on a reproducing subspace of BV) then it has the diagonal property.
A second issue involves games with discontinuities on or near the
diagonal. The diagonal formula gives such a simple method of calculating
the value that it would be very convenient if we had a formula that
allowed us to derive the values of such patchwork games from their com-
ponent values.
The simplest class of such games are the truncation games. For
simplicity, we will limit attention to vector measure games, so the range
of coalitions we have to consider has finite dimension. Let V = f°y be
such a game, and let V(i,t) be the game defined by
if y.(C) < t
V(i,t)(C) =
V(C) otherwise
Moreover, suppose that V S pNAD n pNA', where pNAD is the space pNA + DIAG,
pNA is the closure in the variation norm of the space of polynomials of NA
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measures, DIAG is the space of functions of bounded variation vanishing
in a neighborhood of the diagonal, and pNA' is the closure of the space
of polynomials of NA measures in the sup norm. Then there is a u-value
for V(i,t), and it is given by
1
YV(i,t)(C) = V*(tx
I
)y1 (C) + / 3cV*(tXl)dt
where V* is the extension of V to the space of "ideal set functions" and
d denotes the directional derivative in the direction C. In our vector
measure case, this formula becomes
n 1
VV(i,t)(C) = f°(t.y(*))y (C) + E u (C) / f.(fy(I))dt
j-1 2 t J
which has the following meaning: the worth of the "pivotal coalition"
which is a t-scale sample of I is divided according to u., the truncating
measure. For the rest of the game, we proceed as usual, integrating the
partial derivatives f
. up the diagonal, and combining them so as to
obtain the integral of the directional derivatives.
Now suppose that we have several such truncations. We can combine
them using the linearity of the value and the diagonal property. Con-
sider the game described by the following figure. It depends on two
measures, and has been built up using four different underlying games.
Since our eligible spaces of games are algebras, we can decompose this
into a set of sums of simple truncations of eligible games which gives
us the right games in a neighborhood of the diagonal
.
This is done in
the second figure below, and the results shown in the third figure.
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L_v._
V,
\ Diagonal
a
h---V-^3.
+
VA~- V3_+ _VL \_^
y v.
v. v3
- v
2
+ M
a
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From these pictures it is clear that, if V denotes the composite game,
i>V = ijA^ + i(,(V
2
-V
1
)(2,B
1
) + tJ;(V
3
-V
2
)(lTa) + ^(V^) (2, S 2 )
Letting V. = f °u and denoting the first partial derivatives of f w.r.t.
its first and second arguments by f.. and f_, respectively, we may apply
the previous formula for the value of truncations of vector measure games
to obtain
<J,V(C) = v (C)[f
3
Ccui(I)) - f
2 (ay(I)) + /
1 fj(ty(I))dt + J f
2 (ta(I))dt
L
6
B, - 1 ,
+ /
zf^(tu(I))dt + J f*(ty(I))dt]
a B
2
+ u
2
CC)[f 2 (6 iy (I))
- f^vCl)) + f 4 (B
2y(D) - f
3
(B
2y(D)
+ /
1fhtp(I))dt + / f 2 (ty(I))dt + / 2 f 3 (ty(I))dt
e
x
a
+ / f*(ty(I))dt
h
which is just the result we expect. The truncations divide the diagonal
into intervals: [0,6 ), [g ,a), [a,6 2 ), and lB-,1] . The value is the
integral of the directional derivative up the diagonal, using each char-
acteristic function in the interval to which it belongs, together with
adjustments for the jumps. In these adjustments, the "jump" (for in-
2 1
stance (f - f )(B, y(I)) at g.. ) is divided according to the measure de-
fining the jump.
Finally, we must deal with the question of what happens when the
jump is not defined by a single measure, but takes place across an
arbitrary mainfold. As long as the manifold is transverse to the diagonal,
-22-
n
we can write the boundary locally in the form Z a. v. k, where k is
i=l 1 1
a constant and the a. are finite scalars, chosen so that their sum is
=1. We remark that this can be done if and only if the manifold is
transversal to the diagonal, so that the tangent to the manifold and
the tangent to the diagonal span the tangent space of the range of at
that point. In this case, the jump is multiplied for coalition C by
n
Z a.u.(C). Of course, this means that the manifold must be continuously
i=l
differentiable in a neighborhood of the diagonal, so that the game can be
written in terms of n+1 measures. Suppose that V = f°y, where y is an
n-vector of NA measures. Now consider the game V defined by
V(C) iff gCu(C)) >_m
V(C) =
otherwise
where g: R + R is differentiable in a convex neighborhood of the diagonal,
at least for values in a neighborhood of m. We can rewrite this game,
after observing that dg, the gradient of g, is a linear function. There-
fore, dg«y is itself a measure, and V' = V(n+l,m), where y = dg«u.
There are several cases where this cannot be done. For example, if
g is not differentiable at the diagonal, the implicit measure cannot be
assigned unambiguously and the value is not uniquely defined. An example
is V = minfy ,y„,c], where c is a constant, since this game is the same
as
minly^y^ if minly^u^ <_ c
V(C) =
c otherwise
-23-
and it is well-known (cf Aumann-Shapley, p. 140) that this does not have
a nice value. Another case is provided by functions g with the property
that dg is not transverse to the diagonal at the jump, since the measure
will be degenerate at that point.
The next question relates to the emptiness of the core. Since the
value reflects the expected utility of taking part in the game, it is
defined independently of core considerations, and retains its interpre-
tation as the unique outcome satisfying the conditions of equity and
efficiency spelled out in the axioms defining the value. If the core
is empty, then any efficient allocation can be prevented by a coalition
acting in its own interest. However, the value is more prospective,
since it abstracts from the question of which coalition will form. For
this reason it is best suited to valuation questions, where the expected
worth of the firm as of t=0 is of interest. Nonetheless, it is inter-
esting to know when the core is nonempty. For general nonatomic games,
the answer was found by Schmeidler. Let V be a nonatomic game and define
n
I V 1 = sup E a.V(C)
i=l
where the sup runs over all finite sequences of nonnegative weights a.
and coalitions C. with the following properties:
n
i) C. = I
i-1 L
n
ii) for each t I, 2 a.xr (t) = 1
- i XL*.1=1 i
where xr (t) i-s c^e indicator function of coalition t; equal to 1 if t C
Li
and otherwise. Then Schmeidler's result is that the core is nonempty
iff |V| = V(I).
-24-
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APPEMJIX
Brief Summary of Characteristic Functions and Values (taking P = 1)
I. Characteristic Functions:
if S < S
V
Q
(E,B:S) = /IVCICS),S) - ICS)]
-mintE.B] if S TS ,S 1
a b
IV(I(S),S) - I(S) - 1]. E + B if S > S
V^E.BrS) =
if S < S
IV(ICS),S) - I(S) - 1].E + B if S > S
— a
V
2
(E,B:S) =
if S < S
a
of E < j
[V(I(S),S) - I(S) - 1]-E + B otherwise
f if S < S or E < -
a 2
V
3
(E,B:S) = /[VCB.S) - B] -E + B if S>S. E > k and B < i CS)
IV(KS) - ICS}J-E + B otherwise
where
v(i(s ),s ) = i(s ).a a a
V(I(S
b
),S
b )
= I(S
b
) + 1
-A2-
II. Values
These values are linear combinations of the equity measure, E(C)
and the debt measure D(C) of the coalition C, so we shall present the
"shadow prices" or shares accruing to equity and to debt separately.
These are given in the form of t = present values, with q(S) being
the price at t = of $1.00 at t = 1 contingent on the occurrence of
state S. Other simplifying definitions we shall use are:
Us
c
= \
l
Q(S) = / q(S)dS
S
1
G(S) = / q(S)(V(I(S),S) - I(S))dS
S
A. Shadow prices of equity
V iIGCV + G(V - QCV ]
\: !G(Sa ) - Q(Sa )]
V
2
: !GCS
a
) -^Q(S
a
)]
f
V„: there are two cases to consider, depending on whether S S .
3
In Case I, S < S and the shadow pirce of equity is
c a
k I q(S)V(i,S)dS + |Q(S ) + G(S ) - / q(S)lCS) [V(I(S) ,S) - ^-]dS
q
a
S
+ J q(S) / VCt,S)dt
ab
S 1/2
a
In Case II, S > S and the shadow price of equity is
c — a
-A3-
S 1 •
/
C
q(S)[VCl(S),S) - ICS) -|]dS +7 / q(S)VC|,S)dS + | Q(Sc ) + G(Sc )
C
1
Tro ° 1 r CSl
- / qCS)I(S)IV(I(S),S) -±i|i]dS + / q(S) / V(t,S)dtdS
S S 1/2
c c
B. Shadow Price of Debt
V ^V
v
2
: i^V
V_: in Case I, with, S < S , we get3 ' c a' °
s i
1
i
X tw l I(S)|Q(S
a
) - y / q(S)V(f, S)dS+ J q(S)I(S) IV(I(S) ,S)- -^-]dS- / q(S) / V(t,S8 Z
S
l
S
Z
S 1/2
a a a
and in Case II, with S > S , we obtain
c — a'
S 1
/
C 3l|I dS + | Q(S c) - \\ q(S)[V(|,S) + I(S) IKS) - 2V(I(S),S)]JdS
a
1 KS)
- / qCS) / v(t,s)dtds
s 1/2
c
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